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HOW TO JUSTIFY AN EMERGENCY REGIME
AND PRESERVE CIVIL LIBERTIES IN TIMES
OF TERRORISM
Emanuel Gross*
"Foras adamant as my country has been about
civil liberties during peacetime, it has a long history
offailing to preserve civil liberties when it perceived
its national security threatened ...After each
perceived security crisis ended, the United States has
remorsefully realized that the abrogation of civil
liberties was unnecessary. But is has proven unable
to prevent itselffrom repeating the error when the
next crisis came along.,"'
I. INTRODUCTION
The opening quotation was made by Justice William J. Brennan,
one of the great justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, during a speech
given in Israel in 1987. Today, more than twenty years later, it seems
that the U.S. government's response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks against its citizens has illustrated Justice Brennan's argument
indisputably.
Times of emergency, and especially national security
emergencies, pose a complicated constitutional challenge to the
democratic state. In order to fulfill its duty to protect the lives and wellbeing of its citizens and restore public order as soon as possible, the
state must make use of wider administrative powers than those required
in times of peace. However, the use of these powers inherently
infiinges the traditional scope of protection given to individual rights
.

Professor of law, University of Haifa. LLB, LLM, SJD, Tel Aviv
University. Colonel, Former President of the Military Tribunal of Southern
Command, Israel. Email: egross@research.haifa.ac.il. Thanks are due to my
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I William J. Brennan, The Quest to Develop a Jurisprudenceof Civil
Liberties in Times of Security Crises, 18 ISR. YEARBOOK HUM. RTs. 11 (1988).
2
See Asa Kasher & Amos Yadlin, Military Ethics of Fighting Terror:
An IsraeliPerspective,4 J. MILITARY ETHICS 3 (2005).
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and freedoms in times of peace. Therefore, a proportionate balance
must be struck between two competing interests: state and public
security on the one 3hand, and individual fundamental rights and
freedoms on the other.
Shaping this balance is not an easy task. While the need to
protect fundamental rights and freedoms does not justify undermining
national security in every situation, national security is not a supreme
value, and the need to ensure it does not always justify violating civil
liberties.
The outcome of this balance necessarily requires the
imposition of certain limitations, both on civil liberties and on the
state's security interest. 4 In particular, terrorism related emergencies
intensify this constitutional challenge due to their special nature, which
bears no resemblance to other forms of national security threats. In
light of the special nature of the fight waged between democratic states
and terrorist organizations, a controversy exists as to how a democracy
should respond to the terrorist threat: whether its response ought to be
bound by the traditional legal constraints imposed by the constitution or
whether the uniqueness of terrorism exigencies justifies creating a new
"extraordinary" constitutional paradigm. 5
This article suggests that although terrorism-related emergencies
entail unique characteristics in comparison to traditional forms of
national security emergencies and bring unprecedented legal dilemmas,
these new dilemmas should nonetheless be dealt with by the ordinary
array of constitutional balances and not by creating a new
"extraordinary" constitutional order for times of crisis. Terrorism
exigencies should not be perceived as standing outside the ordinary
legal order; rather, the state's response to the exigency should be found
within the boundaries of the ordinary constitutional order and should be
accompanied by effective oversight mechanisms. We shall try to
explore the normative characteristics of an emergency regime in
3 See infra sections III and IV.
4 Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in
a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REv. 16, 153-56 (2002).
5 See generally Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113
YALE L.J. 1029 (2004); Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to
Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011 (2003); David
Cole, The Priority of Morality: The Emergency Constitution's Blind Spot, 113
YALE L.J. 1753 (2004); Laurence H. Tribe & Patrick 0. Gudridge, The AntiEmergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1801 (2004); Mark Tushnet,
Emergencies and the Idea of Constitutionalism, THE CONSTITUTION IN
WARTIME - BEYOND ALARMISM AND COMPLACENCY 39 (Mark Tushnet ed.,

Duke University Press 2005).
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general and to find out whether we can justify such a regime in a war
on terrorism.
Section I of this article examines the variety of normative
definitions accorded to the concept of "emergency" by legislatures,
scholars, and the international community; it suggests five core
characteristics that ought to distinguish times of emergency from times
of normalcy. Section II examines the unique applicability of each of
these five elements to terrorism related states of emergency. Section III
analyzes the desirable balance of power between national security,
human rights, and liberties in times of crisis. Section IV analyzes the
desirable scope of judicial review during times of terrorism related
emergencies.
1I. STATES OF EMERGENCY - DEFINITIONS AND
CHARACTERISTICS
The life of a nation, as history teaches, entails an inherent
combination of peace and times of emergency. The nature, intensity,
and frequency of each of these periods of time may vary from state to
state and from time to time; however, there is no nation which has not
experienced exigencies that have been caused by wars or other security
threats; rebellions and revolutions; economic crises; epidemics; large
scale environmental hazards; or natural disasters.
The variety of the possible exigencies is infinite. From a short
review of worldwide events in recent years, we can learn of the efforts
of the states in east Asia to recover from the enormous damage caused
by the massive tsunami that killed more than two hundred thousand
people; of Sudan, whose citizens suffer from a large-scale humanitarian
disaster as a result of an extended and blood soaked civil war; of Iraq
and Afghanistan, which aspire to instill the values of liberal democracy
after long years of oppression; and of the Western democracies, which
are constantly occupied with thwarting terrorist threats posed by
extreme religious and nationalist groups.
In order to protect the public in times of emergency, the
Executive Branch is conferred with wider administrative powers than in
times of peace. While the transition from times of peace to times of
emergency does not entail special normative difficulties for
authoritarian regimes, the transition in democracies intensifies the
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tension between two conflicting interests.6 On the one hand, it is
necessary to infringe the traditional scope of protection given to
individual rights and freedoms in times of peace in order to effectively
deal with the crisis and restore public order as soon as possible. On the
other hand, the state must make sure that it uses only the necessary
measures least damaging to human rights. Thus, it is important to
distinguish between states of emergency - which require an unusual
normative response - from other dangers and threats, which should be
addressed with the ordinary powers conferred on the state in times of
peace.
We shall now examine what normative preconditions ought to
exist in order for a state of emergency to be declared. In the next
section, we shall examine the unique application of these preconditions
to terrorism related states of emergency.
The concept of emergency has never received an objective and
descriptive definition that clearly expresses its scope of application.
Although numerous efforts have been made to define it, these
definitions were vague and devoid of precise analytical meaning. The
reason for this, as was eloquently expressed by Alexander Hamilton, is
that "[i]t is impossible to foresee or to define the extent and variety of
national exigencies ...
The circumstances that endanger the safety of
7
nations are infinite[.],,
Indeed, as reality shows, states of emergency may occur due to
an infinite variety of circumstances and in various levels of severity.
Furthermore, because states also vary from one another in the size of
their territory, culture, and the constitutional structure of their
governments, every attempt to define in the parameters that
characterize the emergency in advance is inherently flawed as it ignores
the need to examine
each event according to its unique context and
8
circumstances.

6

See Itzhak Zamir, Human Rights and National Security, 23 ISR. L.

REv. 375, 376-79 (1989); Venkat Iyer, States of Emergency - Moderating
Their Effects on Human Rights, 22 DALHOUSIE L.J. 125, 127 (1999).
7 THE FEDERALIST No. 23 (Alexander Hamilton).
8
See The International Law Association, Paris Report, 59 para. i
(1984), quoted in Jaime Oraa, HUMAN RIGHTS IN STATES OF EMERGENCY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 31 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1992) ("[1]t is neither
desireable nor possible to stipulate in abstractowhat particular type or types of
events will automatically constitute a public emergency within the meaning of
the term; each case has to be judged on its own merits taking into account the
overriding concern for the continuance of a democratic society.")
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In spite of these preliminary difficulties, numerous attempts have
been made to define the concept of emergency, both at the domestic
and international level, as well as by various scholars. In Israel, The
Basic Law: The Government confers on the parliament (and in
situations of exceptional urgency on the government as well) the
authority to declare a state of emergency. 9 Although the Basic Law
does not contain a definition of the phrase "state of emergency," it
states that during times of emergency the government may issue
emergency regulations in order to protect state security, public safety,
and the supply of crucial services. ° From this statutory arrangement, it
follows that the purpose of the declaration of a state of emergency is to
authorize the government to issue the necessary temporary orders to
protect these services. From these three objectives, it can be concluded
that the Israeli Legislature applies the concept of "emergency" to
events which are capable of disrupting the ability of the state to defend
its existence, threatening the safety of its citizens, or interrupting the
supply of essential services within its territory.
In Canada, the Emergencies Act distinguishes between four types
of emergencies: "public welfare emergency," "public order
emergency," "international emergency," and "war emergency."" Each
type of emergency is defined in the act. For example, a public order
emergency is defined as "an emergency that arises from threats to the
security of Canada [and] that is so serious as to [be] a national
emergency," and war emergency is defined as "war or other armed
conflict, real or imminent, involving Canada or any of its allies that is
so serious as to be a national emergency."
In the international arena, the United Nations International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights defines public emergencies as
situations that threaten the life of the nation. 12 The U.N. Human Rights
Committee generally characterizes states of emergency as times of an
exceptional and temporary nature. 13 The Siracusa Principles on the
Limitation and Derogation Provisions define a state of public

9 Basic Law: The Government, 2001, S.H. 1780, available at http: /
ww w.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic 14_eng.htm.
'0 Id. § 39(a).

11 Emergencies Act, R.S.C., ch. 22 §§ 5, 16, 27, 37 (1985).
12 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 4(1),
December 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force: March 23, 1976).

13 U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29 on Article
4 of the International Covenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, para. 2, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/2 1/REV. 1/ADD. 11 (August 31, 2001).
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emergency as "a situation of exceptional and actual or imminent danger
which threatens the life of the nation."1 4 Further,
[a] threat to the life of the nation is one that (a)
[a]ffects the whole of the population and either the
whole or part of the territory of the State, and (b)
[t]hreatens the physical integrity of the population,
the political independence or the territorial integrity
of the State or the existence or basic functioning of
institutions indispensable to ensure
and protect the
15
rights recognized in the Covenant.
The American Convention on Human Rights defines times of
emergency as situations of war, public danger, or other emergency that
threatens the independence or security of the state. 16 The Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(European Convention) defines states of emergency as times of war or
other public emergency threatening the life of the nation.1 7 In the
Lawless report, the term "public emergency threatening the life of the
nation" has been defined by the majority members of the European
Commission of Human Rights as: "a situation of exceptional and
imminent danger or crisis affecting the general public, as distinct from
particular groups, and constituting a threat to the organized life of the
community which composes the state in question., 18 In the Lawless
judgment, the European 9 Court of Human Rights has adopted the
Commission's definition.'

14 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Commission on Human Rights, Status of
the InternationalCovenants on Human Rights, Annex: The Siracusa Principles
on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, para. 39, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/4 (1985).
15 The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions
in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, para. 39, Annex,
UN Doc E/CN.4/1985/4 (1985).
16 Pact of San Jos6, Costa Rica, American Convention on Human
Rights art. 27(1), November 22, 1969, O.A.S.Treaty. Series No. 36, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force: July 18, 1978).
17 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 15(1), November 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. (entered into force:
September 3, 1953).
18 Lawless v. Ireland, App. No. 332/57, 1 Eur. Comm'n. ofH.R.Dec. &
Rep. 15 (1960).
19 Lawless v. Ireland, 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 56 (1961) (No. 3), It
should be noted that while the English text of the judgment refers to "an
exceptional situation of crisis or emergency," the French text - which is the
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In the Greek case, the Commission described the main
conditions necessary for the existence of a state of public emergency:
(1) it must be actual or imminent;
(2) its effects must involve the whole nation; and
(3) the continuance of the organized life of the
community must be threatened.
The crisis or danger must be exceptional, in that the normal
measures or restrictions permitted by the Convention for the
20
maintenance of public safety, health, and order are plainly inadequate.
Many scholars have also tried to define the concept of "emergency,"
whose lexical meaning is of critical importance as a sudden and urgent
incident, usually unexpected, which requires an immediate and
extraordinary response. 21 Carl Schmitt, one of the prominent legal
theorists in this field, characterized the concept of emergency as "a case
of extreme peril, a danger to the existence of the state, or the like. 22
The International Law Association defines a public emergency as "an
exceptional situation of crisis or public danger, actual or imminent,
which affects the whole population or the whole population of the area
to which the declaration applies and constitutes a threat to the
23
organized life of the community of which the state is composed.,
The most obvious feature of the above mentioned definitions is their
vagueness. In order to encompass as many potential emergencies as
possible, all the definitions are formulated in broad and inclusive
language, which can be interpreted in various ways. Thus, some
scholars believe that it is not useful to formulate a universal definition

official text of the judgment - adds a requirement for the imminence of the
attack. This point is made in para. 112 of "The Greek Case," infra note 20.
20 The Greek Case, 1969 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON H.R. 72,
153 (Eur.
Comm'n on H.R.) (1969); Oren Gross, Once More unto the Breach: The
Systemic Failure of Applying the European Convention on Human Rights to
EntrenchedEmergencies, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 437, 457 (1998); Oren Gross &
Fionnuala Ni Aolain, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS: EMERGENCY POWERS IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE, 249 (Cambridge University Press 2006); Christopher
Michaelsen, InternationalHuman Rights on Trial - The United Kingdom's and
Australia'sLegal Response to 9/11, 25 SYDNEY L. REV. 275, 288-89 (2003).
21 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (Brian A. Garner ed., Minnesota, West
Group, 2004); THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD DICTIONARY 806 (5th ed., 1993).
22

CARL SCHMITr,

POLITICAL THEOLOGY:

FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE

THEORY OF SOVEREIGNTY 6 (George Schwab trans., MIT Press 1985).
23 The Paris Minimum Standardsof Human Rights Norms in a State of
Emergency, 75 AM. J.INT'L L. 1072, 1075 (1985).
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of the concept of emergency. In their opinion, every working definition
of a state of emergency will necessarily be amorphous and therefore
unable to provide practical standards to distinguish between times of
emergency and times of peace.24
Although this approach does raise valid arguments, which should
in no way be disparaged, it cannot justify abstention from formulating a
definition. Indeed, the concept of emergency cannot be precisely
defined. Its potential scope of application is infinite and is not subject
to prediction. It may change from time to time and from one society to
another. Nevertheless, it is certainly possible to define the core
elements that characterize all states of emergency. True, such a
definition, by its nature, has an "open texture" - i.e., it does not aspire

to describe specific events, but makes use of general and sweeping
terms which ought to be adapted to the changing reality. Its
implementation depends on the unique characteristics of every
individual case. Thus, it is not inevitable that a certain incident will
amount to a state of "emergency" in one context but not in another.
It is true that such a "framework definition" cannot provide a
high level of clarity and certainty as to what constitutes an emergency.
However, it is capable of delineating the substantive guiding standards
as to when the state is confronted with genuine times of emergency and
when it is confronted with other difficulties and disruptions which do
not amount to states of emergency.25 In my opinion, it is possible to
identify five core elements that distinguish states of emergency from
states of normalcy. First, a state of emergency exists when a state's
sovereignty is at risk. According to international law, one of the
requirements in order for a political entity to be recognized as a "state"
is the existence of an effective governmental mechanism which is
capable of performing all necessary administrative functions. 26 The
fundamental obligation of the government is to ensure state and public
27
security and the ordinary

supply of essential public

services.

24 See Gross, supra note 20, at 438.
25 See generally Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness in Law and Language:
Some Philosophicallssues, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 509, 522-26 (1994) (arguing that

vagueness can be reduced by defining clear boundaries).
26 See generally Conference on Yugoslavia, Legal Opinions of the
Arbitration Committee, Opinion No. 8, 31 I.L.M. 1494, 1522 (1992) (noting
that a state ceases to exist when it can no longer exert authority over its defined
territory).
27

AssA CASHER, MILITARY ETHics 38 (Ministry of Defense Press

1996); Inaki Agirreazkuenaga & Greer Steven, Shoot to Kill: The Lethal Use of
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Disruption of the ordinary supply of governmental services may cause
danger to human life, national security and public order, public health,
and foreign relations. When such a destructive event occurs, the
situation amounts to a state of emergency requiring special treatment in
order to prevent the realization of the danger or at least deal with its
harmful consequences ex postfacto.
Second, a state of emergency may exist only in light of grave
and exceptional threats. 28 The definitions accorded to the concept of
"emergency" do not determine how injurious the event must be in order
to justify the transition from normalcy to the exception. Specifically,
they do not determine whether only existential threats may justify such
a transition. Perhaps even non-existential threats, that undermine
public order or disrupt the ordinary supply of essential services, may
also amount to states of emergency. 29 The prevailing view is that
0
existential threats are not the only exigencies meriting exception.
There is no doubt that existential threats are the core of states of
emergency, and that threats which may only result in minor injuries do
not justify transition from normalcy to the exception. Between these
3
two extremes, however, we may find "hard cases." I These hard cases
contain characteristics that cannot be defined in advance, but must
If this
always be examined in light of their specific context.
examination shows an unusual threat which may put the state's

Firearms by the Security Forces in the Basque Country, 45 N. IR. LEGAL Q.
285, 287 (1994).
28
SYSTEM

JOAN FITZPATRICK, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRISIS: THE INTERNATIONAL

FOR

PROTECTING

RIGHTS

DURING

STATES

OF

EMERGENCY

55

(University of Pennsylvania Press 1994).
29 It is important to note that due to the various parameters that
distinguish one country from another (such as the size of their territory and the
constitutional structure of their governments), a certain threat may be regarded
as "existential" under one array of circumstances and as "non-existential" under
another.
30 FITZPATRICK, supra note 28, at 55-58; Joan F. Hartman, Derogation
from Human Rights Treaties in Public Emergencies, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 16
(1981). For example, in Lawless, only the five dissenters of the Commission
offered narrow interpretations to the term "public emergency." According to
these interpretations, a state of "public emergency" must be analogous to
circumstances of war or completely break down the constitutional order of the
state. See Lawless (Commission), 1 Eur. Comm'n. of H.R.Dec. & Rep. at 95,
101.
31 Oren Gross, Exception and Emergency Powers: The Normless and
Exceptionless Exception: Carl Schmitt's Theory of Emergency Powers and the
"Norm-Exception "Dichotomy, 21 CARDOZo L. REv. 1825, 1832 (2000).
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sovereignty at great risk, the threat ought to be dealt with within the

emergency paradigm.
Third, the crisis must be of a temporary nature. The temporary
duration of the emergency is an integral part of the notion of the

exception. As normalcy is perceived as the normal state of affairs, the
emergency is perceived as an unusual event which necessitates an
extraordinary response in order to reinstate the normal state of affairs as
soon as possible.32
Fourth, the crisis must be real or imminent. 33 A state of
emergency might occur due to actual threats or in light of an imminent
danger. In the latter case, the state does not have to be inactive until the
actual realization of the danger; rather, it may take preventive actions
accompanied by a declaration of a state of emergency in cases where
the danger is imminent. For example, if a government knows of the
intention and operational capability of an organization to carry out a
nuclear attack within its territory, it would be irrational to wait until the
actual realization of the danger. As a result, the state may take
preventive measures in order to thwart the danger before it occurs.
Nonetheless, it is important to distinguish between immediate threats
and general threats. A government is not entitled to make use of its
emergency powers in light of theoretical or potential dangers which are
not imminent.
Fifth, a declaration of the existence of a state of emergency is
within the powers of both the Legislative and Executive branches.
Nonetheless, the power retains a judicial character despite becoming
more exclusively Executive during times of emergency. For this
reason, it is especially important to determine the standard of proof
needed to satisfy the elements of imminence and severity of the
expected danger. The standard of proof required reflects a balance
between the public interest in granting an appropriate degree of latitude
to the Executive in order to effectively fulfill governmental
responsibilities, and the interest of the individual in minimizing the risk
of erroneous declarations of states of emergency which entail
32

R. St. J. Macdonald, Derogations Under Article 15 of the European

Convention on Human Rights, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 225, 241 (1997);
Susan Marks, Civil Liberties in the Margin: the UK Derogation and the
European Court of Human Rights, 15 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 69, 85-86
(1995).
33 Macdonald, supra note 32, at 241; Claudio Grossman, A Framework
for the Examination of States of Emergency Under the American Convention on
Human Rights, I AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 35, 42 (1986).
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unnecessary limitations of the individual's civil liberties.34
The
standard evidentiary test for civil law, "preponderance of the evidence,"
creates a high risk for erroneous declarations of emergency.
In
contrast, the standard evidentiary test for criminal law, proof "beyond
a reasonable doubt," is also inappropriate due to the difficulty of
collecting evidence relating to terrorist activities. The appropriate
constitutional balance in this case requires the government to reach a
level of "clear and convincing" proof, which, in its nature and scope,
falls between the civil and criminal standards. This burden requires
something more than a showing of reasonableness. The evidence
submitted must clearly and unequivocally indicate the nature of 35the
threat with regard to both its imminence and its anticipated severity.
III. TERRORISM RELATED STATES OF EMERGENCY
A wide variety of circumstances may satisfy the five core
elements of states of emergency mentioned above. As noted in the
previous section, these are general elements which should be applied
according to the unique context and characteristics of each event. In
this section, we shall examine the unique applicability of each of these
five elements to terrorism related states of emergency.
Generally, it is possible to identify a number of unique
characteristics of a terrorist act. Typically, a terrorist commits an act
that fits one of the following characteristics: destruction of lives,
property and public order; motivated by ideology; or seeks to provoke
fear, suspicion, anxiety, panic, or dread among all or specific sections
of the public.36 In contrast to the traditional wars between sovereign
states, terrorist acts are not carried out by combatants who carry their
arms openly, have a fixed emblem recognizable at a distance, and
conduct their operations in accordance with the laws of war. On the
contrary, terrorist attacks are carried out by combatants operating from

34 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
35 See Emanuel Gross, Human Rights in Administrative Proceedings:A
Quest for Appropriate Evidentiary Standards, 31 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 215
(2001).
36 EMANUEL GROSS, THE STRUGGLE OF DEMOCRACY AGAINST
TERRORISM: LESSONS FROM THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND

ISRAEL 16 (Virginia University Press 2006).
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the center of civilian populations
in order to enjoy the protections
37
afforded citizens in times of war.

Although a terrorist act is criminal in nature, society deems it
much more serious and blameworthy. 38 The terrorist act does not draw
its unique gravity from the cruel and brutal way in which it is carried
out or from the severe physical and mental injuries and property
damage it causes its victims, because ordinary criminal acts can be
carried out in an equally abhorrent way. The terrorist act is distinct
from other criminal acts by virtue of the unique immoral quality of its
motives. 39 Whether acting against a liberal democratic state whose
values threaten his fundamentalist beliefs or an enemy that controls his
forefathers' land, the terrorist severs himself from humanity, with its
moral, legal, and social customs, and devotes himself solely to his
ideological beliefs. Moral values, humanitarian obligations, and basic
human conventions are brushed aside if they conflict with his ultimate
commitment. Rejecting law and morality, the terrorist will work to
advance his cause using all the means he considers effective. The
terrorist's attacks possess a personal touch in that he is not interested in
the identity of the concrete victim, but only in the victim's affiliation
with the entity against which he is fighting. Perceiving an individual as
a means to an end creates the psychological effect of fear, suspicion,
and dread among the public. Often times, this heightened fear bears no
relation to the direct damage caused by the specific terrorist act. This
fear stems from the fact that an individual may become the victim of
the next terrorist attack.
According to this unique set of characteristics, it is possible to
conclude that "terrorism" can be defined as the systematic and
deliberate commission (or threat of commission) of injurious acts

37 Id. at 199; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva IlI]; BRUCE
ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK - PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN
AGE OF TERRORISM, 66 (Yale University Press 2006).

38 See Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National
Security Law, and the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA.
L. REV. 675, 718 (2004); George P. Fletcher, The Indefinable Concept of
Terrorism, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 894 (2006).
39 GROSS, supra note 36, at 13; Alex Schmid, Terrorism - The
DefinitionalProblem, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 375, 404 (2005).
40

GROSS, supra note 36, at 13; Reuven Young, Defining Terrorism:

The Evolution of Terrorism as a Legal Concept in InternationalLaw and Its
Influence on Definitions in Domestic Legislation, 29 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 23, 56-57 (2006).
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which, in the circumstances of their commission provoke fear and panic
among all or part of the public, when these acts are directed against
innocent civilians or their property for the purpose of advancing

political, social, or religious ideology. 41 Similar acts directed against
government or military targets not only constitute acts of terrorism but
also amount to actual acts of war. 42 There are
no moral or legal
43
justifications that can support a terrorist's cause.
It is important to examine the effect that the unique
characteristics of a terrorist act have on the implementation of the five
core characteristics of states of emergency.
The first two elements of states of emergency deal with transition
from normalcy to the exception in light of grave and exceptional threats
to the existence or ordinary function of governmental mechanisms.
Although existential threats meet these requirements, less severe threats
may also justify transition from normalcy to the exception provided
that they are capable of significantly disrupting public order and the
ordinary supply of essential services. Indeed, it is this latter possibility
that describes most contemporary terrorist threats.
An examination of the ideological platforms of terrorist
organizations around the world shows that while some organizations
operate with the intention of bringing about the complete or partial
destruction of the group under attack, other terrorist organizations do
not have the ultimate goal of eliminating all of the members of the
group against which they are struggling. The latter organizations,
despite the heinous nature of their activities, perceive their violent
struggle as a strategic means for attaining specified objectives. 44 They
do not perform acts of terror with the intention of bringing about the
complete defeat of their enemy, but instead seek to disrupt public order
and weaken their enemy's stability and strength.
There is no doubt that existential terrorist threats justify
transition to an emergency regime. Despite that, the difficult question
remains in trying to determine what terrorist threats characterized as
non-existential justify such a transition. As noted, the terrorist threat is
41 GROSS, supra note 36, at 11-12 (discussing in detail the difficulties
preventing the formulation of a universal legal definition of a terrorist act).
42 Alberto R. Coll, The Legal and Moral Adequacy of Military
Responses to Terrorism, 81 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 297, 298 (1987).
43 Louis Rene Beres, The Meaning of Terrorism - Jurisprudentialand
Definitional Clarifications, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 239, 242 (1995);
Fletcher, supra note 38, at 4(E).
44 GROSS, supra note 36, at 20.
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characterized by creating a psychological effect of fear among the
public to a degree that bears no relation to the direct damage caused by
the specific terrorist act. Thus, it seems that the severity of the terrorist
threat should not be assessed according to the concrete damage caused
by each isolated attack, but as a combination of both the physical and
psychological damage caused by the threat in general. The September
11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the citizens of the United States
illustrates this argument: in spite of the great number of victims and the
enormous extent of property damage, the attacks did not pose an
existential threat to the U.S. government. Nevertheless, the attacks
were perceived by the Bush Administration as a sufficient reason to
declare a state of emergency in the United States.45 Although the
rationale underlying this initiative was the unusual severity of the
attacks, the transition to an emergency regime occurred because of their
overall cumulative physical and psychological impact.
The third element of states of emergency deals with the
temporary duration of the emergency. Due to the unique nature of the
terrorist threat, the implementation of this classic element of terror
exigencies entails distinctive features. In contrast to the traditional
armed conflicts between sovereign states, the terrorist threat has no
defined beginning and end. Its ending can be reached only by a total
and decisive victory. A cease fire is not a realistic option. Victory over
terror requires the absolute neutralization of the terrorist enemy without
leaving any possibility for its future rehabilitation. This objective can
only be achieved by means of a terrorist's capture, incarceration, or
46
A..aslt
eradication.
An absolute neutralization of the terrorist enemy is
almost never possible and a substantial neutralization necessitates
prolonged activity. This neutralization process involves, inter alia,
infiltration into the organization in order to gather useful intelligence,
eliminating financial support, and capturing the political and spiritual
leaders of the organization. These objectives are not easily achieved.
Notwithstanding this approach, which might be considered extreme and
maybe unrealistic, there are different schools of thought which combine
the termination of terrorism with an attempt to deal with the reasons

45 Proclamation No. 7463, 66 FED. REG. 48199 (September 14, 2001).
46 GROSS, supra note 36, at 55-56.
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that sow the seeds of this phenomena.47 However, these and similar
approaches also set goals whose achievement is no less difficult.
In contrast to the traditional risks, which are caused by wars
between sovereign states, financial crises, natural disasters, and
epidemics, the overwhelming majority of the terrorist threats are lasting
threats. Any attempt to define their duration is artificial. A prime
example is the constant emergency regime that has existed in Israel
since its establishment in May 1948. Since its inception, the State of
Israel has been forced to contend with continual security threats. Israeli
citizens have always been subject to security threats and murderous
attacks by religious and nationalist terrorist organizations. In order to
effectively respond to these threats, a state of emergency has been
declared. As noted in the previous section, the declaration of the
existence of a state of emergency empowers the government to make
use of extensive security powers in order to defend state and public
security and ensure the ordinary supply of the essential services.
Although the declaration of a state of emergency is limited to a
maximum period of twelve months, it has repeatedly been renewed by
parliament each year. In practice, a state of emergency has always
prevailed in Israel since its establishment 48
Courts around the world have reached similar conclusions upon
examining the element of temporariness in the context of terrorist
threats. For example, the House of Lords authorized the decision of the
British government to declare a state of public emergency as a result of
47

See generallyKevin J. Fandl, Winning the War on Terror Without the

War, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 587 (2004) (detailing economic and social
alternatives to armed conflict against terrorism); Brian Burgoon, On Welfare
and Terror - Social Welfare Policies and Political-Economic Roots of
Terrorism, 50 J. CONF. RESOL. 176 (2006) (discussing the correlation between
poverty and terrorism).
48 Adam Mizock, The Legality of the Fifty-Two Year State of
Emergency in Israel, 7 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 223, 227 (2001). It
should be mentioned that in 1999 the Association for Civil Rights in Israel

petitioned the Supreme Court and argued that the constant renewal of the
declaration of a state of emergency by the parliament is unlawful since Israel is
not confronted with extraordinary security threats but with security issues
which does not justify transition to an emergency regime. Thus far, the

Supreme Court has not yet ruled in this issue and the declaration of the state of
emergency still exists. It should be noted that in light of the petition, the
parliament and the government have gradually started to amend Israel's
emergency laws in an attempt to set out more moderate and balanced powers.
See HCJ 3091/99 Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. The Knesset [2006]
(unpublished).
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the September 11, 2001 attacks.49
Similarly, the European
Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of Human
Rights emphasized the requirement of the temporal duration of the
emergency, but in practice, both tribunals interpreted this criterion in a
flexible manner
and applied it in a way that undermined its
50
significance.
Nevertheless, I believe that the element of temporariness should
not be regarded as meaningless in the context of terrorism related
emergencies. Instead, its interpretation ought to be adapted to the
unique characteristics of the terrorist threat. As noted, during declared
states of emergency, the Executive authority is conferred with wider
administrative powers than in times of peace. The purpose of the
temporariness requirement is to limit the duration of these powers and
thus promise their application as unusual temporal orders. This
rationale applies both in short-term and long-term emergencies. Yet, in
the latter situations, the temporariness requirement substantially loses
its traditional meaning in the sense that normalcy is no longer perceived
to be the regular state of affairs and exigency as the exception. Instead,
the exigency is perceived not just as a short-term deviation from the
normal state of affairs, but as the prevailing reality for the foreseeable
future.
The importance of the temporariness requirement in these
situations lies in the preservation of the analytical difference between
the normalcy and the exception. 5 2 The temporariness requirement
expresses recognition of the right and duty of the state to make use of
A and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004]
UKHL 56, para. 22.
50 See Gross, supra note 20, at 464.
51 Gross, supra note 20, at 455 ("[a] substantial number of states of
49

emergency in the modem world do not follow the "normalcy-rule, emergencyexception" paradigm. Rather than provisional and temporary emergencies, the
world increasingly faces de facto, permanent, institutionalized, or entrenched
emergencies.").
52 Colim Campbell, 'Wars on Terror' and Vicarious Hegemons: The
UK, InternationalLaw, and the Northern Ireland Conflict, 54 INT'L & COMP.
LAW Q. 321, at part Ill (2005) ("Conceptually, the term 'emergency' is locked
in a dichotomous relationship with the norm by reference to which it is located.
Implicit in this relationship is the temporariness of the emergency. Were it not a
temporary phenomenon, there could be no norm in contradistinction to which it
is defined. This relationship has been variously described in terms of a
governing paradigm of 'normalcy-rule, emergency-exception',
or of the
'implicit counterpoint between emergency and normality', producing the
Iemergency/normality' antimony.") (footnotes omitted)
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the extraordinary emergency powers to thwart the security threats to its
citizens and restore state and public security as soon as possible. The
temporariness requirement prevents an analytical vagueness between
the normalcy and the exception, and it stresses the fact that although the
exigency is about to become the prevailing reality in the foreseeable
future, it will always be perceived as an exceptional state of affairs.
From this, it follows that emergency powers are inherently of temporal
duration and their implementation always represents a deviation from
the ordinary constitutional regime. As a result, the power
53 necessitates
an increased level of parliamentary or judicial oversight.
The last two elements of states of emergency deal with transition
from normalcy to the exception in light of actual or imminent crises
whose imminence and gravity had been proven by the Executive
authority in accordance with the required evidentiary standard. As
noted, when imminent threats have not yet been realized, the state is
not required to abstain from any responses until their actual realization.
In order to thwart the danger, it may take preventive actions
accompanied by a declaration of a state of emergency. In contrast, the
state may not declare a state of emergency in light of speculative and
unspecified dangers, especially when these dangers are not supported
by reliable, intelligent information.
For this reason, a sovereign may not declare a state of emergency
in light of recurring terrorist threats which are being made by an
unknown organization who has never committed such attacks and who
does not possess the operational capability to execute its threats. A
declaration of the existence of a state of emergency under these
circumstances does not satisfy the evidentiary burden of "clear and
convincing" proof regarding the actuality and imminence of the threat.
Under certain circumstances when reliable intelligence information is
available, a sovereign may declare a state of emergency as a preventive
measure within the normative framework of self-defense. The reason
for this is that a declaration of a state of emergency is possible not only
in response to threats which had already been carried out but also in the
face of future imminent dangers. However, in order to take such a
preventive measure, the terrorist threats must be made by an
organization that has the operational capability to carry out such
attacks, notwithstanding the question whether it had actually committed
such attacks in the past. The fact that a terrorist organization has
already proven its dangerous capabilities will be of particular interest
when gauging the imminence of the possible threat.
53

See infra, section IV.
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An additional question with regard to the imminent character of
the emergency is whether a state whose citizens were not subject to an
actual attack may declare a state of emergency as a result of a terrorist
attack which took place within the territory of another country. For
example, following the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United
States, the British government concluded that there was a state of
public emergency threatening the life of its nation, within the meaning
of Article 15(1) of the European Convention. 54 The courts in the
United Kingdom, including the House of Lords, ratified this
determination. 55 The court accepted the government's assertion that the
unprecedented atrocities in New York, Washington, DC, and
Pennsylvania created a new reality in Britain that satisfied the five core
elements of states of emergency.
The courts stated that a state of public emergency may occur
even if there was no imminent threat of a terrorist attack, but rather an
intention and a capacity to carry out serious terrorist violence.56 In
other words, the court determined that even if the government of the
United Kingdom did not have evidence pointing to a specific threat, it
was not required to wait until the actual realization of the danger. In
order to take preventive measures, all it had to prove is that it was
subject to a threat by an organization which had the capability of
implementing it. As the House of Lords noted, a determination
whether a state of emergency does or does not exist under these
circumstances requires
a factual prediction of what various people around
the world might or might not do, and when (if at all)
they might do it, and what the consequences might be
if they did. Any prediction about the future behavior
of human beings (as opposed to the phases of the
moon or high water at London Bridge) is necessarily
problematical[.] It would have been irresponsible not
to err, if at all, on the side of safety.57

54

See Britain Moves

to Detain Foreigners Without Trial, THE

at A18.
55 See A and others v. Sec. of State for the Home Department, [2002]

WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 12, 2001

EWCA Civ 1502; A and others v. Sec. of State for the Home Department,
[2004] UKHL 56. See also Mark Elliott, United Kingdom: Detention Without
Trial and the 'War on Terror', 4 INT'L J. CONST. L. 553 (2006) (discussing
British counter-terrorism activity in the wake of September 11).

56 A and others [2002], paras. 82-85; A and others [2004], paras. 24-29.
57 A and others [2004], para. 29.
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As a result, a state whose citizens were not subject to a terrorist
attack may declare a state of emergency as a result of an attack which
took place within the territory of another country. First and foremost,
the attack must satisfy the above-mentioned five core elements of
terrorism related states of emergency so that there will be no doubt that
the state under attack is entitled to declare a state of emergency. To
justify the heightened state of emergency, a state must prove two
additional parameters: (1) the identity of the attacker and the
motivation for committing the attack; and (2) the degree of ideological
resemblance between the two states. The more similar the ideological
platforms are between the two states, the more justification a state has
in regards to its actions. For example, the United States had been
attacked by al-Qaeda, an international fundamentalist Islamic terrorist
organization intended to bring down infidel regimes around the world
and replace them with religious Islamic regimes. 58 Apart from the vast
physical damage, in terms of the number of victims and the extent of
the destruction, the attack was intended to shatter the symbols of
Western Democracy and thus create fear among the citizens of every
Western democracy. The British government is founded on similar
basic principles as the American government, namely the freedom of
the individual. Both nations share a long tradition of cooperation in
advancing liberal causes and Britain is a major ally of the United States
in the struggle against international terrorism. al-Qaeda's attack on the
United States demonstrated the organization's operational capability
and will to carry out such operations anywhere and at any time in the
future. In light of the great ideological resemblance between the
United Kingdom and the United States, it is not reasonable to demand
the British government to wait for the next disaster to strike before
taking the necessary steps to collect clear and convincing evidence
regarding the nature and severity of the threat.
IV. RESPONDING TO TERRORISM RELATED EMERGENCIES:
THE PROPER NORMATIVE PARADIGM
In light of the unique characteristics of terrorism related
emergencies, we now must address the subsequent question of what is
the proper normative framework for a democracy to deal with
emergencies of this kind?

58

See 9-11 COMMISSION, OVERVIEW OF THE ENEMY, Staff Statement No.

15 (2004), available at: http://www.911 commission.gov/staff statements/staff_
statement I 5.pdf.
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In times of emergency, the Executive branch is vested with wider
administrative powers than in times of peace; however, these powers
inherently infringe upon the traditional scope of protection given to the
individual's rights and freedoms. Thus, although these extraordinary
powers are aimed at enabling the state to effectively respond to the
emergency, they also pose a significant constitutional challenge. There
is no doubt that in times of emergency, preference should be given to
59
security needs, regardless of if they infringe upon human rights.
Nonetheless, security needs are not absolute interests. The infringing
upon human rights in the name of security should be carried out in a
proportionate manner, and then, as a last resort for a temporary period
of time. 60 The constitutional challenge posed before a democracy
during terrorism related exigencies lies in the need to properly
determine to what extent and subject to what restrictions the state
should be entitled to limit the basic human rights and liberties of the
individual.
Generally, there are three possible normative premises to resolve
this constitutional dilemma. First, by preferring national security
considerations over human rights by granting state authorities a high
level of discretion in implementing the effective means available to
thwart the terrorist threat, notwithstanding their harsh implications on
fundamental human rights and liberties.61 Second, by preferring human
rights over national security considerations through preserving, as
much as possible, the traditional array of balances applicable in times
of peace, notwithstanding the exceptional security needs resulting from

" LAURENCE LUSTGARTEN & IAN LEIGH, IN FROM THE COLD: NATIONAL
SECURITY AND PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY, 16 (Claredon Press 1994).

60 Martha Minow, The Constitution as Black Box During National

Emergencies: Comment on Bruce Ackerman's Before the Next Attack:
Preserving Civil Liberties in an Age of Terrorism, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 593,
602 (2006); Yigal Mersel, Judicial Rreview of Counter-TerrorismMeasures:
The Israeli Model for the Role of the Judiciary During the Terror Era, 38
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 67, 91-92 (2005-2006).
61 See RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN
A TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY (Oxford University Press 2006); Eric A.
Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Emergencies and Democratic Failure, 92 VA. L.

REV. 1091 (2006); see also John Yoo, The Terrorist SurveillanceProgramand
the Constitution, 14 GEo. MASON L. REV. 565 (2007) (arguing that increased

government surveillance is a valid exercise of the President's authority as
Commander-in-Chief during wartime).

2008]

How TO JUSTIFY AN EMERGENCY REGIME AND

21

PRESERVE CIVIL LIBERTIES IN TIMES OF TERRORISM
the emergency. 62 Third, by conducting a constitutional equilibrium
between the conflicting interests: the fundamental rights and liberties of
the individual
on the one hand and state and public security on the
63
other.
The first two normative premises reject the notion of "balancing"
and present contrasting, extreme solutions. While the first premise tilts
the scales toward national security considerations in light of the
disastrous consequences that may result because of "too moderate"
responses, which grant human rights a relatively high level of
protection, the second premise asserts that it is simply unnecessary to
sacrifice human rights for security needs since the former may often be
reconciled with the latter. It is not difficult to see that both premises
are improper in a democracy. A state of emergency does not justify the
abandonment of fundamental human rights in the name of national
security; yet, neither does it justify disregarding the extraordinary
security needs resulting from the emergency and thus make the mere
declaration of a state of emergency meaningless. 64 Indeed, both human
rights and security considerations are valuable "goods." The optimistic
assumption, made by the second premise, that both interests can often
be reconciled, or otherwise co-exist, is unrealistic as issues such as
administrative detentions, targeted preventive eliminations, and
interrogations of suspected terrorists, clearly demonstrate.
In contrast, the third normative premise suggests that in times of
emergency, neither of the conflicting interests is made absolute nor
entirely abandoned. Instead, a proportionate balance that requires the
imposition of certain limitations both on the national security interest
and on fundamental human rights must be struck. Finding this proper
constitutional balance between these conflicting interests is one of the
most difficult challenges of a democracy, as it is forced to make
difficult choices and compromises in order to remain faithful to its

62 Kent Roach, The Choice Between Smart, Harsh, or Proportionate
Security Strategies in Canada and Britain, 27 CARDozo L. REV. 2151 (2006);
Christopher Michaelsen, Balancing Civil Liberties Against National Security?
A Criti?ueof CounterterrorismRhetoric, 29 U. N. S. W. L. J. 1 (2006).
Barak, supra note 4, at 155-56; David Cole, The Poverty ofPosner's
Pragmatism:Balancing Away Liberty After 9/11 59 STAN. L. REV. 1735, 174546 (2007).
64 Cole, supra note 63, at 1745-46.
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democratic character.65 Terrorism related states of emergency intensify

this difficulty due to their unique characteristics and the fact that they
compel the state to find solutions to new and unprecedented dilemmas.
We shall now focus exclusively on the third normative paradigm in
order to examine the appropriate response of a democracy to the
dilemmas posed before it in times of terrorism related exigencies.
The implementation of the balancing paradigm in the face of
contemporary security threats is highly complex. To the unique nature
of the terrorist act, one should also add its somewhat irrational
psychological affect on the public. The arbitrariness of the terrorist act,
as well as its murderous and destructive consequences, may well
produce fear, suspicion, and dread among the public to a degree that
bears no relation to the actual probability of the realization of future
attacks. 6 6
Consequently, the public might urge the government to
change the traditional array of constitutional balances between civil
liberties and national security in favor of the latter. The government,
relying on the support of the majority, may act in accordance with these
popular feelings, even in cases where they are not backed by valid

65

See HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v. Commander of IDF Forces in Judea and

Samaria [2002] IsrSC 56(6) 352, 383 ("In this balancing, human rights cannot
receive their full protection, as if there was no terrorism, and state security
cannot receive its full protection, as if there were no human rights. A delicate
and sensitive balancing is needed. That is the price of democracy. It is a dear
price, which is worthwhile to pay. It maintains the strength of the state. It
makes the State's struggle worthwhile."), translation available at http://el
yon I .court.gov.il/FilesEng/al /207/5/0/150/al 5/02070150.HTM; see also HCJ
769/02 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel
[2006] lsrSC 57(6), para 63 ("The question is not whether it is possible to
defend ourselves against terrorism. Of course it is possible to do so, and at
times it is even a duty to do so. The question is how we respond. On that issue,
a balance is needed between security needs and individual rights. That
balancing casts a heavy load upon those whose job is to provide security. Not
every efficient means is also legal. The ends do not justify the means. The army
must instruct itself according to the rules of the law. That balancing casts a
heavy load upon the judges, who must determine - according to the existing
law - what is permitted, and what forbidden."), translation available at
http://elyon I .court.gov.ilI/FilesEng/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.HTM
66 Cass R. Sunstein, On The Divergent American Reactions to
Terrorism and Climate Change, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 503 (2007); Jules Lobel,
Symposium: 9/11 Five Years on: A Look at the Global Response to
Terrorism: The Preventive Paradigm and the Perils of Ad Hoc Balancing, 91
MfNN. L. REv. 1407, 1441 (2007).
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objective needs. This blanket reliance could cause irreversible harm to
the fundamental rights and liberties of the individual.67
It is the need to find ways to calm the popular sense of insecurity
following a terrorist attack that makes the government willing to use
more extreme means against a large ethnic population. The need to
assure the citizens that the government has effective command and
control makes it more compelling and more necessary to find a just
equilibrium to ensure that civil liberties are not sacrificed in the name
of popular sentiment. In this stage, the courts should play their crucial
role as the protectors of the constitution. The subject of judicial review
becomes an important brick in the temple of democracy, particularly in
times of emergency.
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW IN TIMES OF TERRORISM
It is a widely accepted fact that effective judicial review has a
vital role in a democratic regime. It is a crucial mechanism of checks
and balances that ensures protection of the individual against
governmental misconduct and guarantees objective and impartial
justice. 68 Moreover, effective judicial review by the judiciary is a
fundamental constitutional principle in a democracy and an essential
precondition for the protection of the rule of law. This is true in times
of peace and even more so in times of crisis. 69 Nonetheless, the role of
the judiciary during times of crisis, and especially during times of

67

Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, in

73
(Mark Tushnet ed., Duke University Press 2005).
68 Antonio Lamer, The Rule of Law and Judicial Independence:
THE CONSTITUTION IN WARTIME - BEYOND ALARMISM AND COMPLACENCY

Protecting Core Values in Time of Change, 45 U.N.B. L.J. 3, 6-8 (1996);
Aharon Barak, The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democracy, 33 ISR. L. REV.
1 (1999). But see Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial
Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006) (arguing that there is no reason to conclude
that individuals in a democracy are better protected by judicial review than they
would be by the legislature).
69 David Cole, Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and
Individual Rights in Times of Crisis, 101 MICH. L. REv. 2565, 2570-71 (2003);
HCJ 3239/02 Marab v. The Commander of IDF Forces [2003] IsrSC 57(2),
para. 26 ("Judicial intervention stands before arbitrariness; it is essential to the
principle of rule of law . . . [i]t guarantees the preservation of the delicate
balabce between individual liberty and public safety."), translationavailableat
http://elyonl.court.gov.il/FilesEng/02/390/032/a04/02032390.a04.htm.
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7
terrorism exigencies, raises a number of complicated questions:
Should counter-terrorism measures initiated by the legislature and the
executive branches be subject to judicial review? Do courts have the
necessary expertise to adjudicate these kinds of security issues? Should
the courts exercise judicial review at all times or should they abstain
from exercising judicial review during declared times of emergency
and adjudicate the legality of counter-terrorism measures only after the
period of emergency has ended?

As demonstrated by the above questions, the critical role of the
judiciary during times of national security emergencies has never been
self-evident. For example, the Supreme Court of the United States has
a long history of considering military decisions in times of national
security emergencies to be outside the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly taken a restrictive approach and
refrained from exercising judicial review of military matters, asserting
that the Executive Branch and the President, as the Commander-inChief, enjoy full discretion in determining which measures to take
when confronted with a crisis. 7 1
For example, in Johnson v.

70

See Mersel, supra note 60, at 68; Cole, supra note 69, at 2570-71;

WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME
222 (Vintage Press 2000) (1998).
71 John Yoo, Courts at War, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 573, 584 (2006);
Shira A. Scheindlin & Matthew L. Schwartz, With All Due Deference: Judicial
Responsibility in a Time of Crisis, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 795, 813 (2004); see
also In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 8 (1946) ("In the present cases it must be
recognized throughout that the military tribunals which Congress has
sanctioned by the Articles of War are not courts whose rulings and judgments
are made subject to review by this Court . . . They are tribunals whose
determinations are reviewable by the military authorities either as provided in
the military orders constituting such tribunals or as provided by the Articles of
War. Congress conferred on the courts no power to review their determinations
save only as it has granted judicial power 'to grant writs of habeas corpus for
the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of restraint of liberty.' 28 U. S. C. §§
451, 452. The courts may inquire whether the detention complained of is within
the authority of those detaining the petitioner. If the military tribunals have
lawful authority to hear, decide and condemn, their action is not subject to
judicial review merely because they have made a wrong decision on disputed
facts. Correction of their errors of decision is not for the courts but for the
military authorities which are alone authorized to review their decisions."); see
also Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333
U.S. 103, 111 (1948) ("The President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the
Nation's organ for foreign affairs, has available intelligence services whose
reports are not and ought not to be published to the world. It would be
intolerable that courts, without the relevant information, should review and
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Eisentrager,72 the court held that twenty-one German nationals
captured by American forces in China, tried and convicted for war
crimes by the American Military Commission in Nanking, and
incarcerated in occupied Germany were not entitled to be heard by the
American courts. The Court held that because the German detainees
were not tried and incarcerated within the United States' territorial
73
jurisdiction, they had no constitutional right to habeas corpus review.
Even when the Supreme Court has claimed jurisdiction to review
certain military matters in times of emergency, the Court usually denied
74
the petitioner's argument and upheld the government's position.
Typically, the Court has only provided relief to the petitioners and
rejected the government's contentions in cases where the emergency
had already ended.75

perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly held
secret. Nor can courts sit in camera in order to be taken into executive
confidences. But even if courts could require full disclosure, the very nature of
executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial. Such decisions
are wholly confided by our Constitution to the political departments of the
government, Executive and Legislative. They are delicate, complex, and
involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by
those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil.
They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude,
facilities nor responsibility and which has long been held to belong in the
domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.");
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 (1950) ("Certainly it is not the
function of the Judiciary to entertain private litigation - even by a citizen which challenges the legality, the wisdom, or the propriety of the Commanderin-Chief in sending our armed forces abroad or to any particular region.")
72 Johnson, 339 U.S. at 789.
73 Id. at 777; see e.g., United States v. Milch, 332 U.S. 789 (1947);
Brandt v. United States, 333 U.S. 836 (1948); In re Muhlbauer, 336 U.S. 964
(1949).
74 Cole, supra note 69, at 2566; The World War II judgment of
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), is one of the more infamous
examples to the court's reluctance to protect civil liberties during times of
warfare. The court found that the forced exclusion of more than 110,000
American citizens and residents of Japanese ancestry merely due to race
considerations was essential and therefore constitutional by reason of the
legitimate security needs then prevailing.
75 REHNQUIST, supra note 70, at 222. It is important to note that
Korematsu's conviction was overturned four decades later when the court
concluded that his relocation and detention were not justified by military
necessity. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
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In recent years, academic opinions have increasingly advocated
restricting the power of judicial review and granting greater power to
the Executive on the grounds that only this will allow an effective and
76
The response of the U.S.
timely response to the terrorist threat.
Executive and Legislative branches to the September 11, 2001 attacks
The
is perhaps the most powerful illustration of this approach.
initiatives which
administrative and statutory counter-terrorism
followed the attacks significantly restricted the power of the Judiciary
to adjudicate certain matters in the name of security interests. The
77
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, the Military Commissions Act of
2006,78 and the Protect America Act of 200779 are only a few recent
examples.

76

See e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE

L.J. 1029 (2004) (suggesting a fundamental change of the existing
constitutional structure, so that in times of emergency the government would
enjoy wider counter-terrorism powers without thorough and timely judicial
review. According to Ackerman, the "emergency constitution" theory is
designed to establish a constitutional legal doctrine that presents a clear
distinction between the powers of the government in times of crisis and its
powers in times of peace, and thus guarantee the limitation of civil liberties to
times of emergency only and prevent unnecessary and long-range restrictions
on individual freedoms in times of peace); Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules:
Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J.
1011 (2003) (arguing that there may be circumstances that justify use of means
which violate accepted constitutional normes in order to thwart terrorist threats,
provided that public official's openly and publicly acknowledge the nature of
their actions); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 61, at 1097, 1128-44 (arguing in
favor of maintaining a high level of judicial deference in times of emergency
due to the fact that during these periods judges' information is especially poor,
their ability to sort justified from unjustified security measures is limited, and
the cost of erroneously blocking necessary measures may be disastrous).
" Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2600
(2006). The Act deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction to consider habeas
corpus petitions filed by or on behalf of foreign nationals designated as "enemy
combatants" and detained in military custody at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Instead, the act confers on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit exclusive jurisdiction to review only the legality of the above
mentioned designation.
78 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat.
2600 (2006). Although the act provides statutory authority for the military
commissions' trials, it still does not bring the trials into compliance with the
Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Geneva Conventions, but rather
adopts less strict procedures and evidentiary rules which deviate from the rules
and procedures that apply to trials by military courts-martial. In addition, the
act contains provisions which limit judicial review by U.S. federal courts. In
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Because the heavy burden of dealing with terrorist threats rests
with the Executive and the Legislative Branches - not the Judiciary only they are being held accountable for the consequences of their
counter-terrorism actions. However, history teaches that when the
Judiciary does not carry out active and sufficient judicial review, there
is an increased danger of the constitutional scales tilting excessively
toward security needs at the expense of the fundamental rights of the
individual. Subsequent to the September 11, 2001 attacks, it seems that
this has been the guiding principle for the U.S. Supreme Court, in
formulating a more active and vigorous judicial approach. In contrast
to the traditional judicial deference afforded to the political branches of
government during times of crisis, the Supreme Court has demonstrated
a greater willingness to review the legality of counter-terrorism
measures initiated by the Legislature and the Executive Branches since
2001.0
Nonetheless, it is important to note that when the Court asserted
the justiciability of the war on terrorism, the Court relied on the fact
that the petitioners were entitled to constitutional safeguards because
they were either American citizens 81 or foreign nationals detained in
military custody at the Guantdnamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba, a
particular, the act eliminates habeas corpus review as to any military
commission trials and prohibits the courts to base their rulings on international
law norms, including the Geneva conventions; see also Jennifer Trahan,
Military Commission Trials at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba: Do They Satisfy
International and ConstitutionalLaw?, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 780, 821-27
(2007) (analyzing the legality of military commission procedures); Carlos
Manuel Vazquez, The Military Commissions Act, the Geneva Conventions, and
the Courts: A Critical Guide, 101 A.J.I.L. 73 (2007) (detailing the provisions of
the MCA that address the judicial enforcement of the Geneva Conventions).
79 Protect America Act of 2007, 110 Pub.L. No. 55, 121 Stat. 552. The
act grants the law enforcement authorities extensive security measures and at
the same time also diminishes the degree of judicial review. Among other
things, the act amends the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
(FISA) and authorizes warrantless electronic surveillance to phone calls and emails made between the United States and foreign nations. It should be
mentioned that the Act containes a sunset provision to the effect that these
amendments are intended to expire 180 days after its enactment; see also
William C. Banks, A Look at the Global Response to Terorrism: The Death of
FISA, 91 MINN. L. REv. 1209 (2007) (arguing that that constutional protections
not infringed by FISA should be retained).
80 Yoo, supra note 71, at 573; Cole, supra note 69, at 2578; Scheindlin
& Schwartz, supra note 71, at 816-17.
81 See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004); see also Hamdi, 542
U.S. 507.
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territory over which the United States has exercised plenary and
exclusive jurisdiction for more than a hundred years and is likely to
maintain control of in the foreseeable future.82 In essence, the court
ruled that citizens of the United States and non-citizens detained at
Guantinamo Bay are entitled to seek judicial redress from U.S. federal
courts. 83 The court failed to clarify whether its rationale was limited
only to the detainees held at Guant~namo Bay or if it may also extend
review to the detention of non-citizens held in U.S. custody anywhere
in the world.84 As a result, it is currently unclear whether people
detained by the U.S. military forces situated in Afghanistan or Iraq are
entitled to judicial redress from U.S. federal courts. Similarly, it is
unclear whether the courts would exercise jurisdiction over foreign
nationals held in U.S. custody outside the United States and review the

82

See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548

U.S. 557, 623-24, 634 (2006) ("The military commission was not born of a
desire to dispense a more summary form of justice than is afforded by courtsmartial; it developed, rather, as a tribunal of necessity to be employed when
courts-martial lacked jurisdiction over either the accused or the subject matter.
. Exigency lent the commission its legitimacy, but did not further justify the
wholesale jettisoning of procedural protections. That history explains why the
military commission's procedures typically have been the ones used by courtsmartial. That the jurisdiction of the two tribunals today may sometimes overlap,
does not detract from the force of this history; Article 21 did not transform the
military commission from a tribunal of true exigency into a more convenient
adjudicatory tool. Article 36, confirming as much, strikes a careful balance
between uniform procedure and the need to accommodate exigencies that may
sometimes arise in a theater of war. That Article not having been complied with
here, the rules specified for Hamdan's trial are illegal . . . Common Article 3
obviously tolerates a great degree of flexibility in trying individuals captured
during armed conflict; its requirements are general ones, crafted to
accommodate a wide variety of legal systems. But requirements they are
nonetheless. The commission that the President has convened to try Hamdan
does not meet those requirements.").
83 Richard H. Fallon Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus
Jurisdiction,Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REv.
2029, 2049-64 (2007); Jonathan Hafetz, Habeas Corpus, JudicialReview, and
Limits on Secrecy in Detentions at Guantanamo, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y &
ETHICS J. 127, 140 (2006).

84 See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 83, at 2058.
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lawfulness of prisoners forcefully
transferred to countries that abide by
85
lesser interrogational restraints.
The rulings of the federal courts pursuant to September 11, 2001
testify to the fact that the judiciary has learned the lessons of the past
and chosen not to fall into the same errors in the future.86 Without
detracting from the great constitutional importance of these rulings, it
should be emphasized that they still fail to provide the full and
comprehensive judicial scrutiny expected from the judiciary in times of
crisis.
As noted, since the Judiciary performs a critical role in
preserving individual civil liberties in times of crisis, it is only in cases
where it fails to conduct an appropriate judicial oversight that the
Executive and Legislative Branches can excessively infringe the
fundamental rights of the individual in the name of security interests.
Indeed, for many years, this has been the guiding perception of the
Israeli Supreme Court in asserting the justiciability of the war on
terrorism. Although the Israeli Supreme Court acknowledged that
judicial review of the legality of the war on terrorism may make the
war harder, it concluded that a thorough and timely judicial review is
an essential component of the rule of law in a democracy.87
Accordingly, the court determined that all counter-terrorism measures
initiated by the political branches of government are subject to judicial
85

It should be mentioned that most federal courts that address this issue

have asserted jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of rendition of
foreign nationals incarcerated at Guantdnamo Bay. See Hafetz, supra note 83,
at 160-65. However, it is unclear whether the courts would also recognize the
federal courts' power to review renditions of foreign nationals held in U.S.
custody in other foreign regions of the world, such as Afghanistan and Iraq.
86 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507; see also supra note 34, para. 23: "As
critical as the Government's interest may be in detaining those who actually
pose an immediate threat to the national security of the United States during
ongoing international conflict, history and common sense teach us that an
unchecked system of detention carries the potential to become a means for
oppression and abuse of others who do not present that sort of threat."
87 Barak, supra note 4, at 159-60 ("One must recognize that the court
will not solve the problem of terrorism. It is a problem to be addressed by the
other branches of government. The court's role is to ensure the constitutionality
and legality of the fight against terrorism. It must ensure that the war against
terrorism is conducted within the framework of the law. This is the court's
contribution to democracy's struggle to survive. In my opinion, it is an
important contribution, one that aptly reflects the judicial role in a democracy.
Realizing this rule during a fight against terrorism is difficult. We cannot and
would not want to escape from this difficulty...").
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review, regardless if they have been conducted inside or outside of the
political border of the State of Israel.88 The federal courts, in contrast,
have thus far taken a much more restrained approach which focuses on
exercising judicial review of military decisions concerning two defined
groups of people: American citizens and foreign nationals detained in
military custody at Guantdnamo Bay. The courts have not yet asserted

jurisdiction over all counter-terrorism activities performed by U.S.
military forces, regardless of whether the United States possesses either
effective control or political sovereignty over the territory where those
activities took place.
The guiding principle of the Israeli Supreme Court is that the
struggle of a democracy against terrorism must be fought within the
rule of law; wherever there is a law, there must also be a court to
enforce it. 89 In accordance with this perception, the Supreme Court,
sitting as the High Court of Justice, has exercised judicial review over a
substantial number of sensitive and complex counter-terrorism

88

HCJ 769/02, lsrSC

57(6); see also supra note 65,

para.

18

("Alongside the international law dealing with armed conflicts, fundamental
principles of Israeli public law, which every Israeli soldier 'carries in his pack'
and which go along with him wherever he may turn, may apply."); HCJ
2056/04 Beit Surik Village Council v. Government of Israel [2004] IsrSC 58(5)
807, para. 24 ("Together with the provisions of international law, 'the
principles of the Israeli administrative law regarding the use of governing
authority' apply to the military commander... Thus, the norms of substantive
and procedural fairness (such as the right to have arguments heard before
expropriation, seizure, or other governing actions), the obligation to act
reasonably, and the norm of proportionality apply to the military
commander."); HCJ 393/82 Jam'iat Ascan Elma'almoon Eltha'aooniah
Elmahduda Elmaoolieh v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the Area of Judea
and Samaria, [1983] IsrSC 37(4) 810 ("Indeed, every Israeli soldier carries in
his pack the rules of customary public international law regarding the laws of
war, and the fundamental rules of Israeli administrative law.").
89 Ariel L. Bendor, Justiciabilityof the IsraeliFightAgainst Terrorism,
39 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 149, 156-63 (2007); HCJ 4764/04 Physicians for
Human Rights v. Commander of IDF Forces in Gaza Strip [2004] IsrSC 58(5)
385, para. 7 ("'Israel is not an isolated island. She is a member of an
international system.' . . . [t]he military operations of the IDF are not conducted
in a legal vacuum. There are legal norms - of customary international law, of
treaties to which Israel is party, and of the fundamental principles of Israeli law
- which set out how military operations should be conducted."), translation
available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/FilesEng/04/640/047/a03/04047640.A
03.htm; HCJ 3451/02 Almandi v. Minister of Defense [2002] IsrSC 30 56(3),
para. 9, translation avaliable at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/ FilesEng/al/ 207/5
/0/150/al 5/02070150.htm.
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practices, such as: the legality of targeted preventive eliminations; 90 the
methods of interrogation;
administrative detentions; 92 house
93
demolitions; and civil liability of the state for counter-terrorism
measures taken by the security forces.94 Nonetheless, it should be
noted that in conducting judicial review of the political branches of
government the court does not substitute its discretion for their own;
rather, the court examines the legality of the counter-terrorism
measures used by the other branches. 95 Among other things, the court
examines the nature and validity of the security considerations that
prompted the legislative or executive action. In addition, the court
examines whether the security measures adopted were the least
damaging to human rights among available measures. As long as these
measures fall within the boundaries of the law, the court will not
intervene.
In this context, it is also useful to examine the approach taken by
the United Kingdom. The British courts, unlike the courts in Israel and
the United States, lack the constitutional power to strike down acts of
90 HCJ 769/02, supra note 65.
91 HCJ 5100/94 [1999] The Public Committee against Torture in Israel
v. Government of Israel, IsrSC 53(4) 817.
92 CrimFH 7048/97 Anonymous v. Minister of Defense [2000] IsrSC
54(1) 721.
93 HCJ 2006/97 Janimat v. Commander of the Central Command
[1997], IsrSC 51(2) 651; HCJ 798/89 Shukri v. Minister of Defense [1990]
(unpublished); HCJ 6696/02 Amar v. Commander of IDF Forces in Judea and
Samaria [2002] IsrSC 56(6) 110; HCJ 6026/94 Nazal v. Commander of I.D.F.
Forces in Judea and Samaria [1994] IsrSC 48(5) 338.
94 HCJ 8276/05 Adalla - The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in
Israel v. Minister of Defense [2006] (unpublished).
9' See HCJ 4764/04, IsrSC 58(5) 385; see also supra note 89, para. 17
("We do not review the wisdom of the decision to take military action. We
review the legality of the military operations."); HCJ 7015/02, supra note 65,
para. 30: ("The Supreme Court, when sitting as the High Court of Justice,
reviews the legality of the military commander's discretion. Our point of
departure is that the military commander, and those who obey his orders, are
civil servants holding public positions. In exercising judicial review, we do not
turn ourselves into experts in security affairs. We do not substitute the security
considerations of the military commander with our own security considerations.
We take no position regarding the way security affairs are run. Our task is to
guard the borders and to maintain the boundaries of the military commander's
discretion . . . [h]owever, we shall not substitute the discretion of the

commander with our own discretion. We shall check the legality of the
discretion of the military commander and ensure that his decisions fall within
the 'zone of reasonableness."').
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Parliament that are incompatible with the Human Rights Act of 1998.
The courts are authorized to make a "declaration of incompatibility"
under section 4 of the Act; however, this does not "affect ...the
validity .

of the

impugned statutory

provision.

96

As to

administrative decisions, the traditional approach was that the Judiciary
would not interfere when national security interests were at stake unless
97
'unreasonable."
totally
or
"aberrant
were
decisions
these
Nonetheless, despite the normative and traditional restraints mentioned
above, the judiciary has demonstrated a sincere willingness to exercise
meaningful judicial review and adjudicate the legality of counterterrorism measures taken by the Legislative and Executive branches.
The cornerstone of this innovative approach was laid down in
December 2004, when the House of Lords declared that section 23 of
the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, which significantly
relaxed the conditions for administrative detention of non-nationals
suspected of terrorism, in comparison to the conditions for detaining
British nationals, was "disproportionate and discriminatory" on the
ground of nationality. 9 8 Although the ruling was purely declarative in
nature, the government felt bound by it and replaced section 23 with the
Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2005, which not only makes no
distinction between nationals and non-nationals,
but also eliminates the
99
possibility of issuing detention orders.

96

Human Rights Act of 1998, ch. 42; A and others v. Secretary of State

for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56, paras. 142, 220; Po Jen Yap,
Rethinking ConstitutionalReview in America and the Commonwealth: Judicial
Protection of Human Rights in the Common Law World, 35 GA. J. INT'L &
COMp. L. 99, 122-24 (2006).
97 Mark Elliott, United Kingdom: Detention Without Trial and the 'War
on Terror',4 INT'L J. CONST. L. 553 (2006); Jeffrey Jowell, JudicialDeference:
Servility, Civility or InstitutionalCapacity?, 2003 PUB.L. 592.
98 A and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004]
UKHL 56, supra note 49; see also Clive Walker, Keeping Control of Terrorists
Without Losing Control of Constitutionalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1395, 1447
(2007) (arguing that counter-terrorism activities cannot undermine the
constutional values they seek to protect); Alexandra Chirinos, Finding The
Balance Between Liberty and Security: The Lord's Decision On Britain 's AntiTerrorism Act, 18 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 265, 273 (2005) (discussing the severe
parliamentary and judicial scrutiny of the ATA).
99 The Prevention of Terrorism Act is aimed at preventing terrorism
related activity through the imposition of derogating and nonderogating control
orders on suspected terrorists. Derogating control orders require derogation
from the European Convention on Human Rights, while nonderogating control
orders impose various restrictions on the individual that do not infringe
convention rights that require derogation.
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The government's remarkable response to this declarative ruling
may be attributed not only to moral and political considerations, but
also to the ability of individual applicants to bring their cases before the
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg and seek appropriate
remedies. However, the British government's response is still very
striking in comparison to the unsatisfactory manner in which the U.S.
government reacted to the Supreme Court ruling regarding the
inadequate structure and procedures of the military commissions. The
U.S. Supreme Court's ruling led to the enactment of the Military
Commissions Act of 2006, which does not present a significant
Instead of assimilating the
improvement in this matter.100
constitutional guidelines provided by the court into the Military
Commissions Act, the Bush Administration chose to gather support in
Congress for the enactment of the Act as is, which may well force the
court to choose whether to intervene once again.
Prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks, the federal courts of the
United States had traditionally shown a high level of deference to
military decisions taken by the political branches of government in
times of national-security crisis. Although this approach has gradually
changed, it is still much more restrained in comparison to the wideranging judicial review implemented by the Israeli Supreme Court. In
order for this encouraging change of direction to continue, the federal
courts ought to assert jurisdiction over all counter-terrorism operations
performed by U.S. military forces, even if these operations take place
in a territory over which the United States does not possess effective
control or political sovereignty. Only then will the judiciary be able to
successfully fulfill its critical role in protecting the fundamental values
of democracy in times of national exigencies. It should also be noted
that because the courts lack the power to guarantee proper
implementation of their rulings by Congress and the President, public
opinion and moral commitments play a crucial role in this context.
Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court, as the interpreter of the
Constitution, does have the authority to review the constitutionality of
the Acts of Congress. Whether it chooses to do so effectively when
national security matters are at stake is the core question.

" See Hamdan, 548 U.S.
accompanying text.

557; see also supra note 78

and
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V. CONCLUSION
The struggle of democracy against modem terrorism involves
finding solutions to new and unfamiliar dilemmas.
Terrorism
exigencies not only do not fit the traditional pattern of states of
emergency, but they also raise complicated questions regarding the
proper normative framework for a democracy to deal with emergencies
of this kind as well.
Protection of the fundamental civil liberties of the individual
during terrorism-related emergencies poses complex constitutional
challenges to democratic regimes both regarding the desirable scope of
judicial review and the proper normative framework for a democracy to
deal with this type of national-security emergency. In coping with
these challenges, the state must formulate a proper balance between its
security interest on the one hand and the civil liberties of the individual
on the other. The difficulty in finding the proper balance between these
two clashing interests is great. However, it is also unavoidable. As
Aharon Barak, the Chief Justice of the Israeli Supreme Court, has
written:
This is the destiny of a democracy - it does not see
all means as acceptable, and the ways of its enemies
are not always open before it. A democracy must
sometimes fight with one hand tied behind its back.
Even so, a democracy has the upper hand. The rule
of law and the liberty of an individual constitute
important components in its understanding of
security. At the end of the day, they strengthen its
spirit and this strength allows it to overcome its
difficulties. 1o'
Indeed, it is the right and the duty of the state to thwart terrorist
activities in order to protect its citizens. Yet, it also has a duty to
maintain its democratic character while doing so. The lawfulness of
the struggle against terror is not less important than its success.' 02

101 HCJ 5100/94, 53(4) Isr(SC) 817; see also supra note 91, at 845.
102 See Zamir, supra note 6, at 378; see also Owen Fiss, The War
Against Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 235 (2006)
("It is hard for the Justices, or for that matter anyone, to accept that we may
have to risk the material well-being of the nation in order to be faithful to the
Constitution and the duties it imposes. Still, it must be remembered that the
issue is not just the survival of the nation ... but rather the terms of survival.")

